

Undated memoranda
and charts, c. late
1945 - Jan 1946,

on origins of CIA/INB/MIA,

(assembled by A.B.

Darling, c. 1952-53,

from various
unidentified sources -

including



25X1

files (see ABD SKD
notes on OIC file.)

This is a TEMPORARY DOCUMENT
only, for the use of DCI/HS.
The record copy has been
released to National Archives *
under the HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM.

Date 6/27/91 HRP 89-2

* attached org. chart
subject to State approval

The essential idea of the State Department's proposal--the establishment of a permanent intelligence planning and programming organization in the Government, functioning on a Government-wide basis--was arrived at by the Director of the Bureau of the Budget after a series of intensive studies of departmental intelligence organizations which began in ~~1943~~ 1941

The role that the Bureau of the Budget has sought to give to the State Department, and which the State Department seeks for itself, is leadership in planning and coordination--no more than is appropriate to its primary rôle in the conduct of foreign affairs. It is not seeking to control intelligence operations, other than its own. It is not trying to set up the Executive Secretary of the NIA as a central operating official. It is, in fact, trying to avoid setting him up as such, keeping him rather in the position of a planner and coordinator.

Representatives of the War and Navy Departments have expressed the thought that we ought now to go further toward spelling out operating functions for the NIA. I have attempted

This document has been
approved for release through
the HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM of
the Central Intelligence Agency.

Date 6/27/91
HRP 89-2

HS/HC-32

200095

~~XXXXXX have attempted~~ I have attempted to state my reason for believing that careful study and planning are necessary before any centralized operation can be set up, making the point that the field of intelligence is so varied ^{and so closely related to the conduct of operations} and complicated that not a single answer, ^{the extent of} but many answers, to the problem of centralization and in any given case must be defined in precise detail coordination will have to be found if we are to arrive at a workable scheme.

War Department representatives have indicated that their difficulties would be reduced, at least by a statement of objectives along the lines of the prospectus of functions contained in the War Department's plan for a central intelligence agency. In particular, they desire that the functions of direct procurement of intelligence (i.e., clandestine operations) and the evaluation, synthesis and dissemination of intelligence of national significance should be recognized as appropriate centralized operations.

Approved For Release 2006/03/10 : CIA-RDP83-01034R000200100039-7 means
for accomplishing, on a national scale, the collection
and synthesis of intelligence required in the formulation
of national policy.

Proposed Functions:

10a
b
11a
a. To ~~recommend to the Authority the establishment of~~
such over-all policies and objectives as will assure the most
effective accomplishment of the national intelligence mission.

~~ensure that~~
b. To ~~accomplish on a national scale, the evaluation and~~
synthesis of intelligence ~~relating to the national security~~ is accomplished on a
such national scale,

10c
a. To perform the direct procurement of intelligence and
such other intelligence services of common concern to depart-
mental intelligence agencies as may be determined by the
Authority.

10c
c. To effect the maximum utilization of the product of
existing intelligence agencies.

~~ensure adequate dissemination~~
d. To ~~disseminate~~ within the government appropriate
strategic and national intelligence. of

11b
e. To furnish to any government department or agency,
upon the request of its representative on the Intelligence Board (see
paragraph 5) any intelligence material or evaluation, which, in
the opinion of that member, is necessary for his department or
agency, provided, however, that in the event that the Director believes
it undesirable for any such material or evaluation to be so
furnished, he may submit the matter to the Authority.

change to
10d
f. To conduct such staff visits as will be necessary to
determine whether the activities of all government intelligence
agencies are properly coordinated and to make appropriate
recommendations for improvement.

Proposed Functions:

10 a
11 a
a. To recommend to the Authority the establishment of such over-all policies and objectives as will assure the most effective accomplishment of the national intelligence mission. ✓

b. To accomplish, on a national scale, the evaluation and synthesis of intelligence relating to the national security.

c ?
e ?
a. To perform the direct procurement of intelligence and such other intelligence services of common concern to departmental intelligence agencies as may be determined by the Authority.

10 c
a. To effect the maximum utilization of the product of existing intelligence agencies. ✓

include in E
a. To disseminate within the government appropriate strategic and national intelligence. ✓

include
11 b ✓
f. To furnish to any government department or agency, upon the request of its representative on the Intelligence Board (see paragraph E) any intelligence material or evaluation, which, in the opinion of that member, is necessary for his department or agency, provided, however, that in the event that the Director believes it undesirable for any such material or evaluation to be so furnished, he may submit the matter to the Authority.

10 c ✓
g. To conduct such staff visits as will be necessary to determine whether the activities of all government intelligence agencies are properly coordinated and to make appropriate recommendations for improvement.

h. To procure, train and supervise its own intelligence personnel

ORGANIZATION

1. Composition of the National Intelligence Authority - Secretaries of State, War and Navy.
2. Agency not to become integrated with any one Department.
3. Director of Agency initially to become official of the Department of State with deputies from War and Navy.
4. Establishment of an Intelligence Board as part of the Agency.
5. Executive direction as distinguished from committees.

*To the extent that NIA
determines to be desirable,
To accomplish the evaluation
and synthesis of intelligence
relating to the national
security, and for the formulation
of national policy.*

FACTS:

It is proposed to set up a National Intelligence Authority composed of the Secretaries of State, War and Navy, under which there will be a Secretariat whose missions will be to (a) develop a Government-wide intelligence program, (b) to organize Committees which will formulate specific operating plans designed to carry out that program and (c) to review and modify the program and the operating plans to meet changing needs.

The proposal, as made by the Secretary of State, calls for the Executive Secretary to be an official of the State Department, appointed by the Secretary of State with the approval of the Secretaries of War and Navy. Though an official of the State Department, in his capacity as Executive Secretary of the National Intelligence Authority, he would not act as representative of that Authority.

The Secretary of War has suggested that the Executive Secretary should not be a State Department official but an independent person, with allegiance to no Department.

THE PROBLEM:

Can the Secretaries of State, War and Navy set up an inter-departmental organization, the head of which, and certain of the staff of which, would be employees of no Department but only of the interdepartmental organization?

It is assumed that under his war powers the President could set up a new agency and put the Secretary of State, War and Navy at the head of it. Will the President have similar powers under the pending reorganization bill?